Abstract In this paper we consider the cryptanalysis of the block cipher SMS4. The cipher has received much recent attention due its simplicity and prominence (it is used in wireless networks in China) and a range of differential attacks break up to 21 of the 32 rounds used in SMS4. Here we consider the application of linear cryptanalysis to the cipher and we demonstrate a simple attack on 22 rounds of SMS4. We also consider some advanced linear cryptanalytic techniques which, under the best conditions for the cryptanalyst, might (just) extend to 23 rounds.
Introduction
In this paper we consider the security of the block cipher SMS4 which is reputedly mandated for wireless networks in China [10] . A Chinese description of the cipher was made public in 2006 by the Chinese government, and the first analysis in the open community was published in 2007 [10] . The cipher takes a 128-bit block and key, and it consists of 32 simple rounds. Its intriguing design encourages analysis; something which is due in no small part to the fact that minor variants of the cipher are exceptionally weak.
The first open analysis of a reduced-round version of SMS4 examined the algebraic nature of the algorithm-thereby uncovering the construction of the S-box-and yielded a saturation attack over 13 rounds using 2 16 chosen plaintext pairs and 2 114 operations [10] . This was followed by a differential attack on 14 rounds and then by an impossible differential attack on 16 rounds with the claimed requirements of 2 105 chosen plaintext pairs and 2 107 operations [11] . These are rather complex attacks, and a more natural differential attack has been revealed that suggests that 21 rounds could be compromised using 2 118 chosen plaintext pairs and 2 126.6 operations [22] . This is the previous best known attack in the literature.
In this paper we present the first reported application of linear cryptanalysis to SMS4. Apart from DES [15] , there are few ciphers for which linear cryptanalysis yields a more efficient attack than differential cryptanalysis. However, for SMS4 we propose an attack on 22 rounds of the cipher with less than 2 119 known plaintexts and a work effort roughly equivalent to 2 117 22-round SMS encryptions. The attack can be clearly described and the necessary components have been experimentally verified. We also consider attacks on 23 rounds of SMS4 and highlight some future research directions.
Description of SMS4
We briefly describe the block cipher SMS4, but first we establish our notation.
Notation. For the most part we will be working with 32-bit words, though the context will be clear when we restrict ourselves to bytes. The left rotation (resp. right rotation) of a word x by b bit positions will be denoted x< < <b (resp. x> > >b). The remaining notation is standard in the cryptographic literature.
Encryption and decryption. SMS4 is a 32-round block cipher with a 128-bit key and block. It is an unbalanced Feistel cipher, that repeatedly uses an 8-bit Sbox S. This is described in the appendices and it is, by way of construction [10] , closely related to the AES S-box [16] . We define the L function and the γ function as follows
The action of the round function f on input X i−1 to the i th round of SMS4 is given by f (X i−1 ) = L(γ(X i−1 ⊕ k i ). Two rounds of SMS4 are shown in Figure 1 .
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so only the L-function is changed in comparison with encryption. At the start, the user-supplied key is xor-ed with a constant T = 0xa3b1bac6 0x56aa3350 0x677d9197 0xb27022dc, and the initialization of the generation of the subkeys 1 is as follows:
The key k i for the i th round, for 1 ≤ i ≤ 32 is computed as
where each constant g(i) is defined by
red-SMS4: A small version of SMS4
We confirm some of the work in this paper with experiments, and for these we will need to define a reduced-version of SMS4. This will be a block cipher with a 64-bit key and block size which uses a 4-bit S-box S r . For experiments we chose the S-box used in present [2] . We can define a reduced L r function and a reduced γ r function as follows:
L r was built using the rotations that appear in L modulo 16. In this way, the round function f r used in the i th round of reduced-SMS4 is given by f r (
A reduced version of the key schedule requires us to change the linear function L to L r just as we changed L to L r in the encryption routine, and to revise the per-round constants to g r (i) = ((28×(i−1))||(28×(i−1)+7)).
While linear cryptanalytic methods appeared in [21] , the linear cryptanalytic attack and its application to DES was developed by Matsui [12, 13] . The basic idea is to find a linear approximation to the action of the block cipher. By this we mean a linear equation that includes a bits of the plaintext P r1 , . . ., P ra , together with b bits of the ciphertext C s1 , . . ., C sb and a single bit of key-related information κ. Borrowing the vector inner-product, we will use the notation α·P to denote the sum of plaintext bits P r1 ⊕ . . . ⊕P ra where α = a j=1 2 rj and α is called a linear mask. We will then write a single linear approximation as
If κ (the exclusive-or of subkey bits) is fixed, then Equation 1 will be correct with probability p = 1 2 + and we say that the linear approximation has a bias of . Given a bias of sufficiently large absolute value | | and sufficiently many known plaintext/ciphertext pairs, the value of κ can be deduced thereby revealing one bit of key information. Throughout the paper the term "bias" will refer to its absolute value.
It is well-known that we can recover more bits of the key by using Matsui's Algorithm 2 [12] . Here we use a linear approximation over several inner rounds, say rounds b to c of the r-round cipher, and this approximates one inner bit of key information (which is a function of the subkeys k b , . . ., k c ). Since the inputs to this linear approximation are a function of the plaintext, the ciphertext, and the outer subkeys k 1 , . . ., k b−1 and k c+1 , . . . , k r , if we were to test for a bias as part of an exhaustive search over these outer key bits, then we would expect a bias to appear for the correct guess. In this way we can recover more key information and derive a more practical attack.
Clearly the basic building block to all these attacks will be the linear approximation, and to build a linear approximation we approximate individual components of the cipher and join these together. We will therefore use the following notation for the linear approximation of a component f , say, where we write α f → β if α · X = β · f (X) with some associated bias . Approximations to larger components of a block cipher, such as a round, can be written in the same way.
Linear cryptanalysis and SMS4
To find a linear approximation of SMS4, we first compute the biases of all linear approximations α S → β to the S-box. Then we consider the evolution of a linear mask through the function L. For this, we define the function
and we observe the following. Since for bit-wise rotations α · (x< < <i) = (α> > >i) · x, we have for all 32-bit inputs x, and all linear Figure 1 . Two rounds of SMS4 along with a two-round linear approximation using masks α and β. The input to round i is Xi−1,0 || Xi−1,1 || Xi−1,2 || Xi−1,3.
As can be seen from Figure 1 , we can identify the potential for two-round linear characteristics of the following form:
Such a linear approximation would require the approximation α f → β in the first round and β f → α in the second. Interestingly, by setting β = α this reduces to
and by exploiting the structure of SMS4 in the preceeding three rounds, we derive a five-round iterative linear approximation, of which only the last two rounds are active 0x0011ffba  0x0084be2f  0x007852b3  0x00582b15  0x007905e1  0x005afbc6  0x00a1b433  0x00f1027a  0x00edca7c  0x0083ffaa  0x00fa7099  0x00d20b1d  0x05e10079  0xfbc6005a  0x11ffba00  0x84be2f00  0x3300a1b4  0x7a00f102  0x52b30078  0x2b150058  0x709900fa  0x0b1d00d2  0x7852b300  0x582b1500  0x7905e100  0x5afbc600  0x7c00edca  0xaa0083ff  0x9900fa70  0x1d00d20b  0xa1b43300  0xf1027a00  0xb3007852  0x1500582b  0xb43300a1  0x027a00f1  0xba0011ff  0x2f0084be  0xca7c00ed  0xffaa0083  0xe1007905 0xc6005afb 0xedca7c00 0x83ffaa00 0xfa709900 0xd20b1d00 0xffba0011 0xbe2f0084 Table 1 . The relevant bitmasks for the iterative linear approximations in this paper.
To identify a bit-mask α that yields an approximation α f → α with a good bias, we use the distribution table for linear approximations of the S-box. In this way we can list 24 different (α, L 2 (α)) pairs, where L 2 (α) gives the mask for the output from the S-boxes, and each of these 24 five-round linear approximations holds with a bias of 7 32768 ≈ 2 −10.2 . These are given in Table 1 .
A distinguisher for 18-round SMS4
It is straightforward to see that a classical application of linear cryptanalysis gives us an 18-round distinguisher for SMS4. We can concatenate three of the five-round iterative approximations to give the following 18-round linear approximation with bias 1 :
To combine linear approximations, and to estimate the resultant bias, it is typical to appeal to the so-called piling-up lemma [12] . The suitability of applying the piling-up lemma depends on the algorithms in question; for some, such as DES [15] , it gives accurate results while for others, such as RC5 [18] , an interround dependence means that the piling-up lemma can be misleading [19] . This problem can be particularly acute when we have two consecutive active rounds. However, experimental results below suggest that the piling-up lemma should remain a reasonable tool to use with SMS4. We therefore estimate the resultant bias of the 18-round linear approximation to be 1 = (2 −10.2 ) 6 × 2 5 = 2 −56.2 . This means that if we were to use −2 1 = 2 112.4 known plaintexts then we would expect our distinguisher to identify non-ideal behaviour in the reduced-round SMS4 and/or to recover a single bit of key information with a success rate of 97.7% [12] . With regards to the work effort, we need to evaluate a single bit and increment a single counter 2 112.4 times. This will be a fraction of the work required to exhaustively search a 128-bit key.
In what follows we will use the 18-round linear approximations of the form described above, of which there are 24 (see Table 1 ). It will therefore be convenient to refer to a generic approximation from this class as A 18 α .
Experimental confirmation. To confirm the applicability of the piling-up lemma with the basic linear approximations that we will use, we consider the equivalent linear approximations in red-SMS4. The bias of the best approximation over a single active round-for which the input and output mask is the same-is 2 −5 . So over five rounds, of which two are active, the linear approximation (0, 0, 0, α) → (0, 0, 0, α) with α = 0x040c would have a theoretical bias of 2 −9 . We extend this to give a six-round approximation
with β = 0x0406 and a bias of 2 −2.7 for β f r −−→α. The resultant six-round approximation has a theoretical bias of 2 −10.7 and in experiments with 100 keys using the reduced key schedule and 2 23 known plaintexts, the measured bias ranged between 2 −10.0 and 2 −12.1 with an average of 2 −10.7 .
On extending to 19 rounds. Taking A 18
α we can prepend a single-round linear approximation of the form (α, β, β, β) → (0, 0, 0, α). Here we can choose β so as to maximise the bias of this extra round. For each of the valid L 2 (α) that we identified in Section 3.1, we find that there are 125 possible values to β that give a maximum bias of 2 −10 over a single round of S-box transformations. This means that there are 125 × 24 = 3000 19-round linear approximations with a bias of 2 = (2 −10.2 ) 6 × 2 −10 × 2 6 = 2 −65.2 . While the bias means that such approximations aren't immediately useful to us, the large number of such approximations makes them a tempting object for more advanced analysis, see Section 5.1.
Advanced techniques
We now use the 18-round approximations A 18 α to recover the full 128-bit key. Standard techniques immediately compromise 20-round SMS4, while a novel extension of the work of Collard et al [4] extends this to 22 rounds. In the literature notation, this constitutes a 4R-attack for which there are few precedents.
An attack on 20-round SMS4
The classical approach to using an 18-round distinguisher is to recover key information from the two outer rounds of the cipher. We will use the linear ap- we will need the following definition: Given mask α, denote the restriction of a 32-bit word y by α to be R α (y) where R α (y) consists of the deletion of bits corresponding to the inactive byte. For example, given α = 0x0011ffba then R α (y) = y&0x00ffffff. Note that this can be viewed as a 24-bit quantity even when the inactive byte is not in the most significant position.
It is easy to verify the following (see Figure 2 ). For plaintext P 0 ||P 1 ||P 2 ||P 3 , the bit value α · X 1,3 depends solely on α · P 0 , R α (P 1 ⊕ P 2 ⊕ P 3 ), and R α (k 1 ). We can make a similar observation on the ciphertext, namely that the bit value α · X 19,0 depends solely on α · C 3 , R α (C 0 ⊕ C 1 ⊕ C 2 ), and R α (k 20 ). In our 2R-attack we will recover the values of R α (k 1 ) and R α (k 20 ) giving 48 bits of key information. The rest of the key can be deduced using exhaustive search.
The data-related information that we need to evaluate the approximation is α · P 0 , R α (P 1 ⊕ P 2 ⊕ P 3 ), α · C 3 , and R α (C 0 ⊕ C 1 ⊕ C 2 ) and we can consider a plaintext-ciphertext as being in one of 2 50 possible classes according to the values of these quantities. Note that under the same key guess R α (k 1 ) || R α (k 20 ), two plaintext/ciphertext pairs from the same class yield the same values to α · X 1,3 and α · X 19,0 . In [4] an efficient 1R-attack is described. We extend this approach to give a 2R-attack recovering information from both outer rounds and adopting an optimisation that means we need only store 2 48 rather than 2 50 counters. 
For each key guess
keep a counter, and compute the bias generated during the attack as follows:
] to the score for key guess k . 5. After recovering the 48-bit k , perform exhaustive search on the remaining 80 bits of key.
We expect to recover the right value to the 48 bits of the key by identifying the guess which gives the highest score of absolute value; using [20] the correct key should be recovered with a probability of 99.9% While the work effort for each plaintext/ciphertext pair in step 3 is much less than a round of SMS4, we might estimate the work effort for the first three steps to be equivalent to An optimisation. Even though the work effort for Step 4 is lower than that for data processing, we can adapt techniques introduced in [4] . Consider initialising a (2 48 × 2 48 ) matrix M , where rows are indexed by R α (k 1 ) || R α (k 20 ) and the columns indexed by
j=0 M (i,j) x j and we can view the counters A[·] as a column vector x = A T . Following [4] , since entry M (i,j) is a function of i ⊕ j the entire matrix M (i,j) can be reconstructed from a single row or column, and it is possible to compute the product M x = e with only three products between a Discrete Fourier Transform matrix and a vector [4] .This means that the complexity of generating a set of final scores for each key, represented by a vector e is reduced from O((2 48 ) 2 ) to 3 × O(2 48 log 2 (2 48 )) [4] . The work effort for data analysis can therefore be estimated as 2 Experimental confirmation. To illustrate this more advanced linear attack, we use a 10-round version of red-SMS4 with the same linear approximation as was used in the experiments of Section 3.2, namely (α, β, β, β) → (α, 0, 0, 0) over nine rounds. We will recover information about k 10 , though for red-SMS4 the mask α we use has two inactive bytes. Recalling the bias of the approximation is 2 −10.7 , we take 8 × (2 11 ) 2 = 2 25 plaintexts. The data is separated according to the restriction R α (C 0 ⊕C 1 ⊕C 2 ) and we perform key recovery as outlined in Section 4.1, though adapted to the 1R-scenario. For S r there is a slight complication with the bit mask α since there are equivalent keys for one of the active nibbles. Experiments and analysis show that the best score applies to four equivalent key values, and so we recover at most six bits of k 10 . With the plaintext amount we use, we theoretically have a probability of 99.9% to recover the right six bits of key [20] . In 100 experiments the correct set of keys was recovered 99 times.
An attack on 22-round SMS4
We use A 18 α to make a 4R-attack on 22-round SMS4 (see Figure 3 for the plaintext side of the attack) and we aim to recover k 1 , k 22 , R α (k 2 ) and R α (k 21 ). For the data analysis, we will appeal to the optimisation of Collard et al. [4] described in Section 4.1. 
where rows are indexed by the key guess k = k 1 || R α (k 2 ) || R α (k 21 ) || k 22 and columns indexed by 
(b) Efficiently compute M x = e using [4] . This gives the right result since
and we have a similar expression for the ciphertext side. 5. Recover the 112-bit k from e and search the remaining bits of the key.
The only hypothesis needed to apply [4] to the 22-round attack is that the (2 112 × 2 112 ) matrix M (i,j) (see optimisation to Section 4.1) should only depend on i ⊕ j, which is the case for the expression in Step 2. We expect to recover the right value to the 112 bits of the key from the guess with the highest score of absolute value. With 2 118.4 plaintexts, the method of [20] suggests that we are very likely to recover the correct value, see 
Ongoing and future research
It is natural to consider some more advanced techniques in trying to attack more rounds of SMS4. In this section we consider the use of multiple linear approximations as well as the use of chosen-plaintexts.
Multiple linear approximations
Multiple linear approximations were first proposed in [6, 7] and they have been the subject of much recent analysis [3, 5] . Here we take m different linear approximations, where we use κ j to denote a single bit of key information, The purpose is to use several approximations to reduce the number of plaintexts when keeping the same probability of sucess. Let j denote the theoretical bias of the j th approximation and let e j kouter denote the experimental bias of the j th approximation observed when using the guess k outer for the outer key bits 2 . If, with sufficiently many plaintexts, we compute This requires m2 |kouter| computations, though we only recover the correct value to k outer . However this is usually the most important block of key information to recover.
to be able to draw any substantive conclusions. Our experiments demonstrated improvements to the number of plaintexts required in a successful attack, but the probability of success was somewhat less than anticipated by theory. We therefore leave it as an object of future research to provide a sound estimate for the effectiveness of multiple linear approximations on SMS4.
On using chosen plaintext
Several extensions to linear cryptanalysis consider the use of chosen plaintext. One of these is described by Knudsen and Mathiassen [8] . In early work for this paper we considered using variants of this technique and at first sight it seemed to be well-suited to SMS4. However technical complications meant that it was hard to use these techniques directly with the 18-round distinguisher and we were unable to get any satisfactory advantages. We also considered using differentiallinear cryptanalysis [9] but our preliminary conclusion was somewhat negative. We therefore leave it as an open problem to decide whether chosen plaintext can give any real advantage over the typical known plaintext approach.
Conclusions
In this paper we have considered the cryptanalysis of the block cipher SMS4. The cipher is both actively deployed and of an elegant and simple design, making it of considerable interest to the cryptanalyst. While much of the preceeding work is concentrated on the differential cryptanalysis of SMS4, by turning to linear cryptanalysis we have demonstrated some simple and effective attacks. These yield results which are superior to all previous claims and which, therefore, give the best current attacks on SMS4.
